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CLAUDIO BOZZI∗ 
But is that all there is? Can we really afford to be bystanders?1 
Gerry Bates’s Environmental Law in Australia2 is a welcome new edition of 
this established publication, updated and expanded to include developments in 
areas of waste management, biodiversity, and energy management, amongst 
others. Like previous editions it is thorough, well-structured and scholarly. At 
nearly 1000 pages it organises this vast and dynamic subject into 
comprehensible topics. This is an achievement in itself given that 
environmental law (‘EL’) tends to be a complicated mixture of established 
legal concepts, sui generis reforms, non-legal regulatory ideals, policy and 
legal norms absorbed from and applying across different jurisdictions. The 
book covers all traditional areas of, and treats key issues in, the broad range of 
legally protected interests that constitute the national environmental law 
                                                 
∗ Lecturer in Law, School of Law, Deakin University; Barrister, Victorian Bar. 
1 Email from Professor Fredrico Cheever (University of Denver Law School) to 
ENVLAWPROFESSORS listserv (6 December 2006) in Michael Robinson-Dorn, ‘Teaching 
Environmental law in the Era of Climate Change: A Few Whats, Whys, and Hows’ (2007) 82 
Washington Law Review 619, 620. 
2 Gerry Bates, Environmental Law in Australia (LexisNexis Butterworths, 8th ed, 2013). 
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regime. At the same time — alert to political, economic and social contexts — 
it avoids treating complex social and cultural phenomena such as the 
environment, and EL, as being amenable to doctrinaire applications of laws, 
or reductive principles. 
Any book on national environmental laws must reckon with certain 
limitations — specifically, how to deal with the particularity of laws in their 
national context while at the same time doing justice to the globalisation of 
environmental harm. Texts treating a national regime must keep the 
essentially multi-jurisdictional framework of EL in view at all times for at 
least two reasons. First, because the transboundary nature of environmental 
problems requires both transboundary solutions and an awareness of the way 
in which the legal and regulatory initiatives in one jurisdiction interact with 
another. And, second, because the importance of comparative legal analysis 
should be appreciated, taught and practised in EL courses and advocacy, since 
legal concepts and regulatory approaches are transplanted between 
jurisdictions.3 In these respects Bates’s book is admirable in its survey of 
international instruments, government reports and discussion papers, and a 
range of other material setting the national environment debates in context.  
Comprehensive and self-assured with respect to the centrality of the 
discipline, Bates’s work nevertheless alludes to certain of the anxieties with 
which EL is beset.4 While Bates correctly acknowledges the rapid 
development of EL over the last four decades, this is a short history by legal 
standards. References to earlier laws in which the protection of the land and 
water were at issue only seem to emphasise their isolation, and the relatively 
belated development of the law and justice of the environment. Indeed, rather 
than it being autocthonous, its historical foundations are located in other laws 
such as property and tort law.5  
                                                 
3 N de Sadeleer, Environmental Principles: From Political Slogans to Legal Rules (OUP, 
2002); A Trouwborst, Evolution and Status of the Precautionary Principle in International 
Law (Kluwer International, 2002). 
4 See, eg, A Dan Tarlock, ‘Is There a There in Environmental Law?’ (2003) 19 Journal of Land 
Use and Environmental Law 213; Elizabeth Fisher, Bettina Lange, Eloise Scotford and 
Cinnamon Carlarne, ‘Maturity and Methodology: Starting a Debate about Environmental Law 
Scholarship’ (2009) 21 Journal of Environmental Law 2, 213–50; Owen McIntyre, ‘The 
Proceduralisation and Growing Maturity of International Water Law Case Concerning Pulp 
Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v Uruguay), International Court of Justice, 20 April 
2010’ (2010) 22 Journal of Environmental Law 3, 475–97; S Coyle and K Morrow, The 
Philosophical Foundations of Environmental Law: Property, Rights and Nature (Hart 
Publishing, 2004) 1. 
5 R Cocks, ‘Victorian Foundations’ in J Lowry and R Edmunds (eds), Environmental 
Protection and the Common Law (Hart Publishing, 2000); Coyle and Morrow, above n 4, 1. 
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There is then little opportunity to develop a systematic view of the subject on 
the basis of a purposeful grand narrative.6 Nor perhaps would that be justified 
in a subject with unstable temporal and political boundaries, and a shifting 
scope due to its immediate contact with, and responsiveness to, a complex 
reality; and in a subject where political and economic expediency insist on ad 
hoc regulatory solutions, and view the development of better evidence-based 
regulatory models as an unpragmatic luxury. 7 
Nevertheless, EL has undergone substantive development, not the least 
because of the sheer volume and quality of scholarship which has been 
produced over the last forty years, and which marks it out as one of the most 
vigorous areas of legal scholarship. Both a cause and an effect of this eruption 
of environmentalist jurisprudence is the establishment of important centres for 
environmental law at leading tertiary institutions — evidence that EL is no 
longer an underrated or underrepresented discipline within university law 
schools, and is in fact at the vanguard of interdisciplinary teaching. 
If there are persistent doubts, they centre on the paucity, if not the total 
absence, of discussion of an EL method. Even the earliest studies in 
environmental law acknowledged that EL might amount to little more than a 
set of complex associations developed across disparate concerns, and their 
problem-specific approaches. Stewart and Krier, for example, perceived the 
‘great need’8 to establish a framework within which to assess environmental 
systems of governance, unify a landscape of ad hoc measures, and consider 
the interrelationship of separate environmental issues as a comprehensive 
system rather than a series of discrete regimes. Their text attempted to provide 
a unified conceptual framework to environmental law by viewing issues 
through the lens of institutional and economic policy analysis. Other attempts 
at field unification have followed,9 purchased usually at the price of high 
abstraction, and losing sight of the realism of case by case analysis.  
If there has been some concern about the derivative way in which EL has 
developed, Bates is sensitive to its interaction with other disciplines, such as 
                                                 
6 Sadeleer, above n 3; E Freyfogle ‘Five Paths of Environmental Scholarship’ (2000) University 
of Illinois Law Review 115. 
7 E Fisher, Risk Regulation and Administrative Constitutionalism (Hart Publishing, 2007) 66–9. 
8 Richard B Stewart and James E Krier, Environmental Law and Policy: Readings, Materials 
and Notes (Bobbs-Merrill, 2nd ed, 1978). 
9 Robert Fischman, ‘The Divides of Environmental Law and the Problem of Harm in the 
Endangered Species Act’ (2008) 3 Indiana Law Journal 661; Albert C Lin, ‘The Unifying 
Role of Harm in Environmental Law’ (2006) Wisconsin Law Review 897; Daniel Bodansky, 
Jutta Brunnee and Ellen Hey (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Environmental 
Law (OUP, 2007); Robert W Hahn, ‘The Political Economy of Environmental Regulation: 
Towards a Unifying Framework’ (1990) 65 Public Choice 21–47. 
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biological and environmental sciences, and is keen to demonstrate its newly 
adopted position as an influential field of law. Indisputably, as Bates says, 
without science ‘there would be no Convention on Climate Change or Kyoto 
Protocol’.10 Environmental law, from its earliest appearance on university 
curricula, has regularly engaged scientists, engineers and others, and appealed 
to students in those fields as well as in law, being an area in which lawyers 
and scientists will have reason to work closely together in solving 
environmental problems.11 For example, science determines the triggers for 
the application of the precautionary principle — an anticipatory policy 
whereby decision makers in environmental matters, having inadequate 
information, are to advance cautiously12 — and assesses what constitutes a 
threat to species, or biodiversity, to take but two vital examples. However, EL 
is not merely the handmaiden to a broader scientific or technical discipline. 
Environmental law scholars, like other legal scholars, do not merely consume 
or systematise expert knowledge, but produce, and contribute to, scientifically 
grounded regulatory regimes which incorporate legal reasoning, and legal 
skills into their administration13 — for example, emissions trading schemes14 
and regulatory orders dependent on negotiated outcomes.15  
Nor can EL be ignored by other forms of legal ordering such as corporate law, 
which cannot now be (safely) practised without a thorough knowledge of 
environmental regulation. 
In Chapter 2, Bates sets environmental policy in the broader political and 
economic context of democratic and capitalist value systems. However, in an 
assessment of the development of the role of the law and lawyers in 
environmental decision making and the assessment of decision making, Bates 
acknowledges that the lawyers’ role will require them to expand their set of 
                                                 
10 Bates, above n 2, 32. 
11 See, eg, Cyril M Harris and Albert J Rosenthal, ‘The Interdisciplinary Course in the Legal 
Aspects of Noise Pollution at Columbia University’ (1981) 31 Journal of Legal Education 
128. 
12 Bates, above n 2, 33. 
13 C Joerges and R Dehousse (eds), Good Governance in Europe’s Integrated Market (OUP, 
2002); G de Burca and J Scott (eds), Law and New Governance in the EU and the US (Hart 
Publishing, 2006). 
14 Committee on the Human Dimensions of Climate Change — National Research Council 
(ed), The Drama of the Commons (National Academies Press, 2002). 
15 J Freeman and L Langbein, ‘Regulatory Negotiation and the Legitimacy Benefit’ (2000) 9 
New York University of Environmental Law Journal 60; J Scott and J Holder, ‘Law and New 
Environmental Governance in the EU’ in G de Burca and J Scott (eds), Law and Governance 
in the EU and US (Hart Publishing, 2006); J Steele, ‘Participation and Deliberation in 
Environmental Law: A Problem Solving Approach’ (2001) 21 Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 415. 
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ethical responsibilities beyond those they owe to their clients and the court. 
They need also to acknowledge responsibility for ‘sustainable development’,16 
taking up the implicit challenge in Justice Kirby’s lament that lawyers’ 
devotion to winning has displaced their commitment to truth.17 At the same 
time, the pace at which economic opportunity is recognised, and capital 
mobilised to exploit it, is rarely matched by the development of statute. As a 
result, environmental law and practice must be a pluralist regime of legal and 
non-legal responses. The opposition to the coal seam gas industry by the Lock 
the Gate Alliance — an alliance of many dozens of member groups, including 
community law groups — to which Bates refers18 is a case in point.  
If Bates identifies an overarching paradigm, it is that EL centres on the 
processes and structures of, and governs, decision making. In short, 
‘[e]nvironmental law in Australia is …. all about making sure that impacts on 
the natural environment are identified and taken into account in decision 
making’.19 The processes and structures of decision making encompass the 
rights of citizens to participate in decisions and comment on projects’ 
environmental impacts,20 the risk management strategies of corporations, and 
the legal responsibilities of governments. The focus on decision making also 
acknowledges the nuanced role of EL in ‘enabling and guiding decisions 
rather than commanding proscriptive outcomes’.21  
The book does not take radical stances,22 but neither is it ever merely 
expository. It provides resources for considering fundamental issues radically 
— such as to what extent EL as it is currently practised is complicit with 
political and economic dominance. A persistent tension in EL exists between 
whether EL should prescribe action-oriented rules, or whether it should 
advance mere principles that give guidance to states. This tension may be 
assessed in relation to ‘sustainable development’,23 ‘the central pivot around 
                                                 
16 Bates, above n 2, 18 citing Ben Boer, ‘Our Common Future; the Report of the World 
Commission on Environment and Development: Implications for Environmental Law’ (Paper 
delivered to the International Bar Association, Auckland, NZ, 1989) 15–16. 
17 Bates, above n 2, 12. 
18 Ibid 34. 
19 Ibid 4. 
20 E Scotford, ‘Mapping the Article 174(2) EC Case Law: A First Step to Analysing 
Community Environmental Law Principles’ (2008) 8 Yearbook of European Environmental 
Law 1. 
21 Bates, above n 2, 4. 
22 Compare, eg, R White, Crimes against Nature: Environmental Criminology and Ecological 
Justice (Willan Publishing, 2008); Robert F Kennedy Jnr, Crimes against Nature: How 
George W Bush and His Corporate Pals Are Plundering the Country and Hijacking Our 
Democracy (Harper Collins, 2004); Robert F Kennedy Jnr, ‘Crimes against Nature’ (2005) 18 
St Thomas Law Review 693. 
23 Bates, above n 2, ch 7. 
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which all governmental decision making is increasingly being required to 
revolve’.24 Sustainable development seeks to trade off environmental 
protection against economic development. In the area of biodiversity, 
however, the environmental deficit has on any measure increased without a 
concomitant improvement in economic development and hence living 
standards. This is because impact-assessment principles of damage limitation 
are premised on the acceptance of the loss, to at least some extent, of sensitive 
and important ecosystems.25 Decision making has been captured by interests 
that have steered it away from sustainability and towards development.26 At 
the same time trade-offs favouring development over sustainability have 
failed to relieve the majority of the world’s people from poverty.27  
Bates’ critique of the judicial implementation of the principle of Ecologically 
Sustainable Development (‘ESD’) in the national context is trenchant: 
If ESD is to be pursued seriously … then surely this should be the 
paramount object of legislation. It should be the outcome that decision 
makers strive to achieve, not part of a process that simply requires ESD to 
be considered on the way through to making a decision, and decision 
makers should therefore be instructed to do more than simply ‘have regard 
to’ it.28 
EL is usually distinguished from other legal practices and disciplines by its 
sensitivity to crisis, and its appreciation of the urgency for intervention, and 
the need to sustain the capacity for intervention into the future by developing 
environmental lawyers with appropriate skills. Because of this, EL, more than 
any other legal discipline, accepts the challenge of Marx’s Eleventh Thesis on 
Feuerbach — that ‘[t]he philosophers have only interpreted the world, in 
                                                 
24 Ibid 219. 
25 On the continuing decline in biodiversity and ecosystems see Walter V Reid et al (eds), 
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment Ecosystems and Human Well-Being — Synthesis (World 
Resources Institute, 2005); the IUCN’s Red Data listing process <http://www.iucn.org>; the 
World Wildlife Fund’s bi-annual reports, eg, Living Planet Report 2012: Biodiversity, 
Biocapacity and Better Choices (WWF International, 2012); M L Parry et al (eds), Climate 
Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to 
the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(Cambridge University Press, 2007) and various updates; the Secretariat for the Convention 
on Biological Diversity, Global Biodiversity Outlook 3 (2010) <http://www.cbd.int/doc/ 
publications/gbo/gbo3-final-en.pdf>; United Nations Environment Programme, Global 
Environmental Outlook 5 (2012) <http://www.unep.org/geo/geo5.asp>; and J Rockström et al, 
‘A Safe Operating Space for Humanity’ (2009) 461 Nature 472. 
26 Bates, above n 2, 236–7. 
27 See eg Kate Raworth, ‘A Safe and Just Space for Humanity: Can We Live within the 
Doughnut?’ (Oxfam Discussion Paper, February 2012). 
28 Bates, above n 2, 234. 
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various ways; the point, however, is to change it’.29 The virtue of Bates’s 
commitment to sensible exposition, and his willingness to engage forcefully 
in debate, is that — less dramatically than Marx but nevertheless on the basis 
of the same tension between interpretation and change that Marx perceived — 
he arrives at a conclusion. He adopts a method that makes the text suitable for 
future environmental lawyers in both introductory and advanced courses in 
environmental law.  
                                                 
29 ‘Die Philosophen haben die Welt nur verschieden interpretiert; es kommt aber darauf an, sie 
zu verändern: Karl Marx (edited by Friedrich Engels), Thesen über Feuerbach in Marx-
Engels Werke, vol 3 (Dietz, 1888) 534.  
